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NOTES
The Right to Contribution for Response Costs
Under CERCLA
In 1980, Congress addressed the increasing health and enviro-
mental problems' associated with hazardous waste dumpsites by
passing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).2 CERCLA was designed 3
to help meet these problems by authorizing the government,
through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to clean up
dumpsites under certain conditions. 4 Such cleanups would be fi-
nanced by monies in a "Superfund." 5
CERCLA authorizes the government to recover the cleanup or
response costs6 from any "responsible" party.7 Furthermore, the
Act authorizes both the EPA and the Coast Guard to issue adminis-
trative orders and to seek injunctive relief8 for the purpose of
1 For a list of the major health and environmental problems associated with hazardous
waste dumpsites, see 126 CONG. REC. 26,337 (1980) (statement by Rep. Florio); id. at
26,339 (statement by Rep. Staggers); id. at 30,937 (statement by Sen. Moynihan on the
Love Canal incident). Other members of Congress also spoke on the problems facing their
home states and districts. See generally id. at 26,336-61 (initial debate by House on H.R. 85
and H.R. 7020); id. at 30,897-987 (Senate debate on CERCLA); id. at 31,950-82 (House
debate on CERCLA).
2 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662,
4681, 4682, 33 U.S.C. § 1364, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911, 6911a, 9601-9657, 49 U.S.C. § 11901
(1982)).
3 For a brief overview of CERCLA, see Macbeth & Mayer, An Introduction to Superfund,
30 PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1, 1984, at 53. See alsoJ. ARBUCKLE, G. FRICK, R. HALL, M. MILLER, T.
SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK 415 (7th ed. 1983).
4 See generally notes 35-52 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of when CER-
CLA applies to a waste dumpsite. See also CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982).
5 The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund or "Superfund" includes monies
collected from a tax on crude oil, imported petroleum products, and certain hazardous
chemicals. CERCLA § 211, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662 (1982). Some monies are
also contributed from the general appropriations. CERCLA § 221 (b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9631
(b)(2) (1982). The collection of money for the Superfund is to cease under CERCLA no
later than Sept. 30, 1985. CERCLA § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 9653 (1982). See also notes 35-47
infra and accompanying text.
6 See note 44 infra for a discussion of which response costs can be recovered under
CERCLA.
7 See notes 48-50 infra and accompanying text for a list of the parties liable under
CERCLA.
8 See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). The Act states that the President shall
issue such orders or seek such relief, or he can delegate such duties and powers under
CERCLA § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1982). The President has delegated his authority in this
area. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. § 168 (1982), as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,418, 3 C.F.R. § 187 (1984), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9615, at 544 (West 1983).
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either preventing a hazardous chemical release or having a private
party clean up a release.
Before cleaning up a dumpsite, the EPA generally seeks a set-
tlement with the parties that are potentially liable under CERCLA. 9
If a settlement can be reached, funds for a cleanup are available
without draining the Superfund or litigating liability.
CERCLA was a hurriedly passed compromise bill.' ° Its draft-
ing left open many questions about the extent of liability of the var-
ious toxic waste generators, transporters, and dumpsite owners
involved with a given waste disposal site. The courts have an-
swered some questions, such as whether CERCLA imposes joint
and several liability upon suitable parties1" and whether CERCLA
requires courts to develop a federal common law,' 2 but have not
answered others.
Questions remain in the area of contribution. The Act's legis-
lative history13 and the federal government's implementation of
CERCLA 14 indicate that a right to contribution arises for response
costs whenever joint and several liability exists under CERCLA.
But when can a party sue for contribution? How should damages be
apportioned? And how will a settlement with the EPA affect a future
contribution suit? The EPA has stated that the answers to these
questions will affect CERCLA's proper implementation.' 5
This note will examine these questions in light of recent court
decisions and federal policy, and will suggest an overall framework
for dealing with these and other problems regarding contribution.
9 See Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum on Cost Recovery Actions under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, (Aug. 26, 1983) reprinted in [Fed.
Laws Index] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 41:2861 (1983) [hereinafter cited as EPA Memorandum]. The
EPA reserves the right to enter into consent decrees or other arrangements with one or
more of the parties. Id. at 41:2865. For a discussion of sbttlements under CERCLA, see
Note, The Role of Ityunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
706 (1983).
10 See notes 19-34 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
of CERCLA.
I I See notes 70-85 infra and accompanying text.
12 See note 58 infra. See also notes 86-132 infra for a discussion of federal common law
and contribution.
13 See notes 19-34 infra and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., the EPA's Response of the Lnited States to Motion of Settling Third Party Defendants
to Dismiss, Strike and/orfor a Separate Trial of Third Party Claims, (Mar. 14, 1984),filed in United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., Civ. No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio) [hereinafter cited as EPA
Chem-Dyne Brief]. For a summary of the brief, see [Pending Litigation] ENvrL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 65,826 (1984).
15 For example, the EPA believes that to meet CERCLA's objectives it needs to be able
to reach settlements with various parties. In order to reach settlements, the EPA wants to
ensure that a settling party will not be sued later for contribution. A later suit, in the EPA's
opinion, could prevent some settlements and thus delay CERCLA's implementation. EPA
Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 14.
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I. History and Structure of CERCLA
CERCLA was designed to regulate the cleanup of hazardous
waste dumpsites. Congress previously tried to regulate this prob-
lem through the Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA). t 6 The reporting and monitoring sections of RCRA, how-
ever, provided an inadequate solution, especially with respect to in-
active dumpsites.1 7 CERCLA was designed to pick up where RCRA
left off,1 8 by allowing the government to clean up abandoned
dumpsites, and by imposing liability on certain parties for such
cleanups.
A. Legislative History
The 96th Congress passed CERCLA' 9 in the final days of its
1980 "lame duck" session.20 Initially, three bills had been pro-
posed to deal with the problem of the increasing number of danger-
ous toxic waste dumpsites. 21 These bills were considered by
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). The original act was amended by the Solid Waste
Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980), and by The
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(1984).
17 During the House debate on CERCLA, Representative Weiss quoted EPA Adminis-
trator Douglas Costle's testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. See 126 CONG.
REc. 26,347 (1980). Mr. Costle stated: "Confronted by [the various toxic waste] problems,
we were forced to realize that the existing legal authorities are inadequate to deal with them
in many ways." Id. See also Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114
n.12a (D.NJ. 1983); Dore, The Standard of Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some
Quirks of Superfund, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260, 265-67 (1981).
18 See Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1441.
19 The legislative history of CERCLA can be found in the congressional debate on the
statute, and in the committee reports dealing with the earlier drafts of the final Act. See 126
CONG. REC. 26,336-61 (initial debate by House); id. at 30,897-987 (Senate debate on CER-
CLA); id. at 31,950-82 (House debate on CERCLA); H.R. REP. No. 1016 (Parts I & II), 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119 and S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
20 For a comprehensive overview of CERCLA's legislative history, see Grad, A Legisla-
tive History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund")
Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1982).
21 The two bills introduced in the House were H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
and H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). H.R. 85 was entitled "Oil Pollution Liability
and Compensation Act" and was introduced in January 1979. H.R. 85 would have estab-
lished a comprehensive system of liability and compensation for oil spill removal costs and
damage. H.R. 7020 was entitled the "Hazardous Waste Containment Act" and was intro-
duced in April 1980. That bill was designed to regulate inactive hazardous waste dumpsites
by using reporting, monitoring and cleanups of such sites. The bill introduced in the Sen-
ate was S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill was introduced inJuly 1979 and was
entitled the "Environmental Emergency Response Act." It too dealt with the hazardous
waste problem, but was the most far-reaching of any of the proposals. For a greater de-
scription of these bills, see Grad, supra note 20, at 3.
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various committees, 22 but were not enacted. 23 Instead, Senate
leaders drafted a compromise bill which later became CERCLA. 24
Although CERCLA incorporated parts of the earlier bills,25 it
changed certain sections of those proposals. For example, it elimi-
nated an explicit requirement of strict liability. 26 Sections that
would make such strict liability joint and several, and formulas for
apportionment of contribution were also deleted. 27
Statements of Senator Randolph, one of the key sponsors of
the compromise bill, however, described the content and meaning
of the bill. His statements addressed the standard of liability and
the type of law that would be used to fill in the "interstitial gaps" 28
22 See generally Grad, supra note 20.
23 The House had passed two of the bills before the Senate compromise was intro-
duced. See note 25 infra.
24 See 126 CONG. REC. 30,916 (1980) (statement by Sen. Byrd). See also Grad, supra note
20, at 20.
25 The House had passed H.R. 7020 on Sept. 23, 1980, 126 CONG. REC. 26,798 (1980),
after earlier passing H.R. 85, 126 CONG. REC. 26,369 (1980). Both of those bills were
before the Senate when the compromise bill was introduced on Nov. 24, 1980.
26 See generally 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph). Senator
Randolph was one of the chief sponsors of the compromise bill and was the floor manager
during the Senate debate. The Senate bill also eliminated the Gore Amendment on appor-
tioning liability. See note 27 infra. Additionally, it did not contain any extensive provisions
dealing with oil spills.
27 One of the House bills, H.R. 7020, included an amendment that was proposed by
Representative Gore outlining a formula that could be used for apportioning damages. See
126 CONG. REC. 26,781 (1980). Although the Senate version deleted the formula, the dis-
trict court in United States v. A & F Materials, 478 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984), cited the
Gore Amendment with approval when it outlined its approach to joint and several liability.
Id. at 1256. See also note 76 infra for the relevant portion of the Gore Amendment cited by
the A & F Materials court.
In the summer of 1984, the House passed a bill to amend CERCLA. See H.R. 5640,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). In that bill, the House attempted to clarify the fact that CER-
CIA liability is "strict, joint and several as construed and applied under section 311 of the
[Clean Water Act] and subsection (a) of section 107 [of CERCLA]." Id. § 116.
The bill also outlined what factors a court could use in apportioning damages among
parties liable under the act. The factors a court could consider, among others, were:
(A) the amount of the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant in-
volved;
(B) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous substance or pollutant or contami-
nant involved;
(C) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous substance or pollutant or contam-
inant, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous substance or pollu-
tant or contaminant; and
(D) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local offi-
cials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id. § 116(d), (e). See also H.R. REP. No. 890 (Part I), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 55 (1984). The
Senate failed to act on H.R. 5640 during the last legislative session.
28 For federal statutes, the federal courts have the responsibility of filling in the "inter-
stitial gaps" left by the inevitable incompleteness of all statutes. United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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NOTES
left by the legislation. 29 The Supreme Court has held that such
statements are important in interpreting a statute, especially when,
as here, there is no formal report on the Act as passed.30 The lead-
ers in the House made statements similar to those made in the
Senate. 3'
The Senate passed the compromise bill in essentially the same
form as it was presented;3 2 the House of Representatives passed the
Senate bill without amendment;33 and President Carter signed the
bill into law on December 11, 1980.34
B. Structure
CERCLA establishes a means of controlling and financing both
governmental and private responses to hazardous releases from
waste disposal sites.35 The most significant way in which this is ac-
29 On the issue of liability, Senator Randolph stated that:
[I]ssues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed by traditional
and evolving principles of common law. An example is joint and several liability.
Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and the liability ofjoint tortfeasors
will be determined under common or previous statutory law.
126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980). Since under CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b)
(1982), federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear CERCLA cases, it
appears that the Act calls for the development of a federal common law, at least in the area
of CERCLA liability. See also note 58 infra.
In discussing the relation between the bill and other laws, Senator Randolph also
stated:
The fund, in recouping such costs, or any private damage actions, must rely on
other law-common law or Federal or State statutory law-in lieu of the liability
provisions of section 107 [of the bill]. The determination of exactly what liability
standards, defenses, or other rules apply will be made on a case-by-case basis pur-
suant to regimes other than that of this bill.
126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980). The Senator thus indicated that it was for the federal
courts to fill in any "interstitial gaps" that had been left in the legislation on a case-by-case
basis.
30 The Supreme Court has indicated that such remarks are important to the interpreta-
tion of a statute, where as here, they form the relevant legislative history. See Federal En-
ergy Admin. v. Algonguin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) ("As a statement by one of
the legislation's sponsors, [the explanation deserves to be accorded substantial weight in
interpreting the statute.").
31 See Grad, supra note 20, at 29.
32 Senator Helms proposed the most substantial amendment to the bill which limited
the Hazardous Waste Trust Fund ("Superfund") to $1.6 billion, a decrease from the $4.1
billion funding proposal in the original compromise bill. 126 CONG. REC. 30,936 (1980).
See also Grad, supra note 20, at 20, 25.
33 126 CONG. REC. 31,981 (1980). The House had suspended its rules about allowing
amendments to bills in order to ensure CERCLA's passage before the session ended. Id. at
31,950, 31,982. See also Grad, supra note 20, at 29.
34 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
35 Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla.
1984); State ix rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983); City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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complished is through the "Superfund" the Act established. 36 This
fund is financed by an excise tax imposed on chemical and petro-
leum product generators and operators of hazardous waste sites. 37
Some money also comes from general appropriations. 38 The
money in the fund was intended to help finance private or govern-
mental cleanups of hazardous waste releases.3 9
Before either the government or a private party can make a
claim against the Superfund, a "release" 40 of a "reportable quan-
tity" 4 ' of a "hazardous substance" 42 must occur. When such a re-
lease occurs, either the government can clean up the site using the
Superfund to finance it,4 3 or a private party can perform the
cleanup. 44 If a private party cleans up the release, then he may
make a claim for partial payment of his response costs against other
persons responsible under CERCLA.45 If such a private claimant
cannot get reimbursement from these persons, then he may apply
36 Hazardous Substance Response Fund, CERCLA § 221, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). See
also note 5 supra.
37 See CERCLA § 211, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4612, 4661, 4662 (1982) (CERCLA's reve-
nue raising sections amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.). See also note 5 supra.
38 See CERCLA § 221(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2) (1982). See also note 5 supra.
39 See CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982).
40 See CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). The term "release" is defined,
in part, to mean "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging,
injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment." Id. The defini-
tion also lists a number of exclusions to the general definition. Id.
41 Although the term "reportable quantity" is not defined in CERCLA, the concept is
necessary for CERCLA's implementation. Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1442.
The EPA regulations relating to CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1984), refer to the Clean
Water Act for any definitions not in CERCLA or in the regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 300.6
(1984).
The Clean Water Act regulations define "reportable quantities" as harmful quantities
set forth within the regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 117.1 (a) (1984). Those quantities determined
as being harmful can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 117.3 (1984).
42 See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982). That section of CERCLA re-
fers to the Clean Water Act, which authorizes the EPA to issue a list of toxic pollutants.
Such a list appears at 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1984).
43 See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). If the Superfund finances a cleanup,
the government can sue the parties that are responsible under CERCLA to replenish the
fund. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). For a list of the parties responsible
under CERCLA, see notes 48-50 infra and accompanying text.
For the government to clean up a dumpsite, the site must be on the National Priority
List. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 (1984). That list is to be made in accordance with the
National Contingency Plan outlined by the Act. See CERCLA §§ 101(31), 105, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(31), 9605 (1982).
44 The response costs that a party can recover are listed in CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982). The EPA has also listed the costs it believes are recoverable.
See EPA Memorandum, supra note 9, at 41:2868 (Appendix A). Before costs can be recovered,
a "notice letter" must be sent to the potentially liable party. See CERCLA § 112(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9612(a) (1982). Such letters, however, do not determine liability. D'Imperio v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 252 (D.N.J. 1983).
45 See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982).
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for payment of his expenses from the Superfund.46 If a payment is
made, the Superfund then stands in the shoes of the private claim-
ant and may sue the other responsible persons.47
Parties potentially liable under CERCLA include present and
former owners of hazardous waste disposal sites from which there
are releases or threatened releases, 48 those persons that arranged
for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the facil-
ity,49 and any person who selected such a facility and transported
the hazardous waste to it.50 Congress broadly defined liability to
spread the costs incurred in a cleanup among many parties. 51
Although CERCLA provides that private parties can recover
response costs, most of the Act's language addresses government-
sponsored cleanup efforts. This, coupled with the fact that Con-
gress rushed through the final passage of CERCLA, means that
those parts of the Act dealing with the rights of private parties who
make claims against one another are ill-defined.52
II. Liability for Response Costs Under CERCLA
The federal courts53 have been interpreting CERCLA to clarify
the rights and duties of the various parties involved.54 Before a
46 See CERCLA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (1982). See also notes 48-50 infra and
accompanying text for a list of persons potentially liable under CERCLA.
47 See CERCLA § 112(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c) (1982).
48 Present owners and operators are covered by CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1) (1982). Past owners and operators are covered by CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).
49 See CERCIA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982).
50 See CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982).
51 The Superfund itself helps spread cleanup costs "more broadly throughout the chain
of commerce of hazardous products and waste." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-
20 (1980). The EPA believes that the imposition ofjoint and several liability, coupled with
contribution will help implement the congressional attempt to spread costs. See EPA Chem-
Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 9.
52 See Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D.
Fla. 1984) ("[The) portions of CERCLA's text and legislative history discussing a private
party's right against other private parties vis-a-vis the [Superfund] are ill-defined.") (emphasis
in original).
53 Federal courts have exclusive original jurisdiction for claims under CERCLA. See
CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1982).
54 The federal courts have attempted to construe CERCLA in light of the spirit in which
it was written and the reasons for its enactment. The courts have also tried to interpret the
act to avoid untenable or unreasonable results. Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at
1445. Accordingly, the courts have often gone beyond the legislative history and have
examined the problem addressed by CERCLA. Thus, not every decision is completelyjus-
tified on the basis of the legislative history alone. For a view that a court has gone too far,
see Topol, Chem-Dyne: A Misguided Approach, 7 CHEM. & RAD. WAsTE LrIG. REP. 1 (1983).
In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the
district court examined the Act and found that:
[CERCLA] is designed to achieve one key objective-to facilitate the prompt clean
up of hazardous dumpsites by providing a means of financing both governmental
and private response and by placing the ultimate financial burden upon those re-
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court can reach the question of whether CERCLA allows contribu-
tion, however, it first must decide if CERCLA imposes joint and
several liability. Contribution can be awarded only ifjoint and sev-
eral liability exists. 55 Congress, as noted earlier, left this question
to the courts to decide.56 Courts generally examine whether CER-
CLA imposes strict liability before focusing on the question ofjoint
and several liability.57 This note will examine both of these issues
before exploring the contribution issues.
A. Strict Liability 58
The term "liability" in CERCLA is defined 59 by reference to
section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean
sponsible for the danger. The liability provision is an integral part of the statute's
method of achieving this goal for it gives a private party the right to recover its
response costs from responsible third parties ....
Id. at 1142-43.
55 Joint and several liability can be imposed where two or more persons cause a single
and indivisible harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977). On the liability of
joint tortfeasors generally, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 46-52 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
56 See note 29 supra for Senator Randolph's statement on this point.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 843, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
58 The first step in determining whether to impose strict liability is to decide whether
federal or state law applies when filling the gaps left by the CERCLA legislation. Arguably,
state law should apply because the dumpsites are all within a state and traditionally state
law applies to property law. Federal law, however, is more appropriate in CERCLA cases.
See comments of Senator Randolph, supra note 29. See also United States v. Stringfellow, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,385, 20,386 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5. 1984); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Because Congress intended to
solve what it saw as a "national" problem, the federal courts should follow that intent and
give the problem a "national" solution. For that reason, the courts should try to fill the
interstitial gaps in the CERCLA legislation with a uniform federal common law.
A uniform federal common law will also prevent excessive dumping in states that
follow a less rigorous policy regarding the imposition ofjoint and several liability. This is
especially true in light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), where the Court held that under the commerce clause New
Jersey could not prevent the hauling of garbage from Philadelphia into the state. The
Court stated that "whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by
discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." Id. at 626-27 (emphasis
added).
The Court's reasoning in Philadelphia could easily be applied to hazardous waste
dumpsites instead of only to landfill sites. States generally dispose of the chemical wastes
generated by companies within their state at a location in the state. Thus, under
Philadelphia, the state could not prevent chemical waste dumping within the state solely
because of its origin. In that case, a state might have to bring its joint and several liability
laws into line with other states' laws to prevent excessive dumping due to its weaker laws.
See also 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (comments by Rep. Florio) ("[CERCLA is] to
discourage business[es] .. .from locating primarily in States with more lenient laws" by
the further development of a federal common law); Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
59 CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982).
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Water Act").60 Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, a number of
courts had interpreted section 311 as imposing strict liability and,
in appropriate cases, joint and several liability. 6' This, coupled
with supportive statements made during the floor debate on CER-
CLA62 and the fact that there are only a limited number of defenses
to a CERCLA action, 63 makes it appear that Congress meant for the
courts to impose strict liability under certain circumstances.
In a number of district court decisions to date, the EPA has
convinced the court that the correct liability standard under CER-
CLA § 10764 is strict liability.65 These courts have based their deci-
sions on the Act's legislative history, 66 CERCLA's reference to and
interrelationship with the Clean Water Act, 67 and the character of
the environmental problems that CERCLA was meant to address. 68
Thus, it now appears to be widely accepted by courts and com-
mentators that CERCLA imposes strict liabilty. 69 The next ques-
tion to be examined is whether such liability is joint and several.
B. Joint and Several Liability
Generally, courts impose joint and several liability when two or
more persons independently cause a distinct or single harm.70 In
60 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). For more information on the Clean Water Act, see 1 F.
GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03 (1981); ARBUCKLE, supra note 3, at 81.
61 See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir. 1978); Burgess v. M/V
Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
62 See, e.g., Senator Randolph's statement: "[w]e have kept strict liability in the compro-
mise, specifying the standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act ...."
126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980). Representative Florio also stated that "[t]he standard of
liability in these amendments is intended to be the same as that provided in section 311 of
the [Clean Water Act]; that is, strict liability." Id. at 31,965.
63 For a list of the only defenses to the statute, see CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) (1982). The only defenses listed are acts of God, acts of war, and certain third
party defenses. Id.
64 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
65 See, e.g., Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443
(S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 14 ENvrL. L.
REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,272, 20,274 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 61 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843 (W.D. Mo. 1984); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
66 See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 843; South Carolina, 14 ENvT_. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) at 20,274.
67 See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 579 F. Supp. at 844.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.NJ. 1983).
69 For some commentators that have reached this conclusion, see Tripp, Liability Issues
in Litigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 52
UMKC L. REV. 364, 371 (1984); Note, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act: Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer to Superfund?, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 109,
130 (1982).
70 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1977); PROSSER, supra note 55.
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interpreting CERCLA, courts have noted that although the term
"joint and several liability" 7' was deleted from the final Act, that
fact does not end the inquiry. 72 The entire legislative history,73 ex-
amined in context, shows that those terms were deleted to avoid a
mandatory liability standard which, if applied to all cases, could
cause inequitable results.74 The courts which have held that joint
and several liability may apply have noted that the burden of show-
ing divisible harm will be on the party seeking apportionment. 75
Some courts have examined a variety of factors in determining
whether to impose joint and several liability. 76
71 For the changes made to the original bills, see notes 24-27 supra and accompanying
text.
72 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 n.11 (1969) ("unsuccessful
attempts at legislation are not the best guides to legislative intent"). See also Chem-Dyne, 572
F. Supp. at 807; Conservation Cherp. Co., 589 F. Supp. at 63.
73 See notes 19-34 supra and accompanying text for the legislative history of CERCLA.
74 For example, if the harm could be traced to a single chemical, or even a single barrel,
then holding all parties jointly and severally liable would not be fair. If the term had been
kept in the statute, such results may have occurred. In H.R. 5640, supra note 27, the House
proposed to amend CERCLA to include the term "joint and several strict liability" but it
also would have allowed a court to apportion damages equitably between parties. Id. § 116.
75 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS gives the following illustration of a situation
where the burden of proof is on the tortfeasors to show how damages should be
apportioned:
Through the negligence of defendants A, B, and C, water escapes from irrigation
ditches on their land, and floods a part of D's farm. In D's action against A, B, and
C, or any of them, each defendant has the burden of proving the extent to which
his negligence contibuted to the damage caused by the flood, and if he does not
do so is subject to liability for the entire damage to the farm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 443B(2) comment d, illustration 7 (1977). This exam-
ple is similar to the situation that exists when hazardous materials are released at a toxic
waste site. As with the water from the ditches in the above example, the chemicals from the
dumpsite also spread out and cause harm to neighboring areas. Unlike the illustration,
however, the standard of liability for a hazardous release need not be negligence; as noted
above, CERCLA imposes a strict liability standard rather than a negligence standard for a
recovery to be allowed.
76 The district court in United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill.
1984) suggested that a more moderate approach should be taken with respect to joint and
several liability. The court approved the language in the Gore Amendment, stating:
Under the Gore Amendment, a court had the power to impose joint and several
liability whenever a defendant could not prove his contribution to an injury, how-
ever, a court could still apportion damages in this situation according to the fol-
lowing criteria:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a dis-
charge release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transporta-
tion, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous
waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste;
and
(vi) the degree of cooperation with Federal, State, or local officials to prevent
any harm to the public health or the enviroment.
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The EPA maintains that CERCLA may imposejoint and several
liability in certain cases. 77 All eight courts that have heard the
EPA's arguments have found that if the harm is indivisible, then the
defendants could also be jointly and severally liable for the cleanup
CoStS.
78
In addressing this question, some courts have found that there
are no indispensable parties under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 79 In the cases where a defendant-generator has
sought dismissal on the grounds that the government failed to join
an indispensable party to the CERCLA action, the district courts
have denied the motion.80 The courts have ruled that joinder was
permissive, and -not indispensable, when the liability involved is
joint and several. 8' Because all parties will not necessarily be
joined in a government filed CERCLA action, seeking contribution
in a separate suit may be the best way for a defendant to ensure that
it does not pay more than its fair share for a cleanup. 82
Thus, the statutory history and purpose of CERCLA indicate
that courts should impose strict liability and, in the appropriate cir-
cumstances, courts should impose joint and several liability. All
cases decided to date have done so.8 3 This result seems consistent
with the reasons for enacting CERCLA and the problems it was
meant to solve.84
Once a court has determined that the defendants are jointly
Id. at 1256 (emphasis in original). The court in United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,385 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984) agreed that such flexible approach
should be taken. Id. at 20,387. See also note 27 supra for a discussion of the Gore Amend-
ment and the list of criteria in the 1984 House bill to amend CERCLA.
77 See EPA Memorandum, supra note 9, at 41:2865.
78 See United States v. Argent Corp., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,497,
20,497 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 20,385, 20,385 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling
and Disposing, Inc., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,272, 20,275 (D.S.C. Feb. 23,
1984); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 845 (W.D.
Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
79 FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
80 SeeA &FMaterials, 578 F. Supp. at 1260; United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.,
14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,207, 20,209 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 1984).
81 See A & F Aaterials, 578 F. Supp. at 1260 (parties are not indispensable if they are
joint tortfeasors because plaintiff can choose who to sue); Conservation Chemical, 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) at 20,209. The A & F Materials court, however, suggested that
although a Rule 19 motion was not in order, a defendant could implead other parties under
Rule 14.
82 See Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTm. L. INST) 10,224, 10,232 (June 1984).
83 See note 78 supra.
84 See generally note 1 supra and the sources cited therein for a list of the problems of
hazardous waste, and how CERCLA was meant to meet them.
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and severally liable, the question of contribution becomes relevant.
Because such defendants will be liable for all the response costs for
cleaning up a dumpsite, they will be concerned about recouping
any overpayment of their equitable share. Thus, they will seek con-
tribution from other responsible parties under CERCLA. The EPA
has stated that it believes that some sort of contribution doctrine is
not only fair, but necessary for the implementation of the statute.8 5
III. Contribution
Various aspects of the doctrine of contribution need to be ex-
amined. First, can a federal common law of contribution exist if the
CERCLA statute is silent about such a right? Second, if this right
exists, what type of contribution law should apply? Third, how
should contribution costs be apportioned? Finally, when should a
federal court hear a CERCLA contribution action? These ques-
tions will be addressed, in turn.
A. Federal Common Law of Contribution
The concept of contribution8 6 dates back to 1799, and the case
of Merryweather v. Nixan.8 7 From that early case grew the English
rule that contribution was available to joint tortfeasors, as long as
one of them had satisfied a judgment. A contribution action was
barred, however, if the plaintiff in the action for contribution had
committed an intentional tort.88
Early American courts did not follow the holdings of their Eng-
lish counterparts that allowed contribution in some cases.89 In-
stead, with the exception of a few state courts, 90 the courts held that
no contribution was available forjoint tortfeasors, regardless of any
fault on their part.9 1 These rules have been changed in the last fifty
years, by court decisions in a few states and by statute in others.9 2
85 See EPA Chen-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 2. (The availibility of contribution "will
directly affect the continued ability of the government to provide rapid Superfund re-
sponses .... ")
86 On the subject of contribution in general, see PROSSER, supra note 55, § 50.
87 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). See also Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged
with Negligence-Meryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 175 (1898).
88 For example, see the Merryweather case itself. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
89 See, e.g., Thweatt's Adm'r v.Jones, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 328 (1825). See also Reath, supra
note 87, at 180.
90 See, e.g., Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887).
91 See, e.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R., 196 U.S. 217
(1905).
92 Forty-four states and the District of Columbia recognize a right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors, at least to some extent. In 10 jurisdictions court decisions initially
changed the common law rule. See George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d
219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977);
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151
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The states, however, have not adopted a uniform approach to con-
tribution.9 3 Thus, there is no uniform "American rule" upon which
a federal court may draw if it finds a right to contribution exists
under CERCLA.9 4
So. 208 (1933); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Underwriters at Lloyds
v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354,
141 A. 231 (1928); Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); Ellis
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
Five of these states later adopted contribution statutes. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70,
301-305 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); LA. CIv. CODE ANN., arts. 2100-2105 (West 1977
and Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 42, §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-11-101 to 29-11-106 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 113.01-113.11 (West 1974 and
Supp. 1984-1985).
The remaining 34 states relied upon legislation to change the "no contribution" rule.
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010 to 09.16.060 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2501 to
12-2509 (West Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009 (1962); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 875-880 (West 1980 and Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-
101 to 13-50.5-106 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572o(e) (West Supp. 1984)
(products liability suits only); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 663-11 to 663-17 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-803 to 6-806 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2413 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 412.010-412.060 (Baldwin 1979); MD. CODE ANN., art.
50, §§ 16-24 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2952a-600.2925d (West Supp. 1984-1985); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §27-1-
703 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 17.225-17.305 (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to
2A:53A-5 (West 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to 41-3-8 (1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-I to 1B-7 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 32-38-01 to 32-38-04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-2307.32 (Page 1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §832 (West Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.440-
18.460 (Butterworth 1983); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11 (1969 and Supp. 1984);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. 15-8-11 to 15-8-22 (1984); TEX. REV. CIv. CODE ANN., art. 2212a,
§ 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-39 to 78-27-43 (1977); VA. CODE
§§ 8.01-34, 8.01-35.1 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.040-4.22.920 (West 1984-
1985); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to 1-1-113 (1977).
93 For example, see PROSSER, supra note 55, at 338.
The American Law Institute took a position on contribution in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. The Restatement states in pertinent part:
Contribution Among Tortfeasors
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) [and] (3) . when two or more persons
become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm, there is a right of
contribution among them, even though judgment has not been recovered against
all or any of them.
(2) The right to contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has dis-
charged the entire claim for the harm by paying more than his equitable share of
the common liability, and is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his
share. No tortfeasor can be required to make contribution beyond his own equita-
ble share of the liability.
(3) There is no right to contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intention-
ally caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1977). Although the Restatement takes a gen-
eral position on contribution, it does not take a position on the effect of a release or a
covenant not to sue. Id. § 886A caveat.
94 But see the EPA's reference to the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT,
notes 120-132 infra and accompanying text.
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In two recent cases,9 5 the Supreme Court stated that a right to
contribution under a federal statute could arise under certain cir-
cumstances. 96 Although the Court did not find that a right to con-
tribution existed under the particular statutes in those cases, it
nevertheless approved the possibility that such a right could exist
under other federal statutes.97
In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. ,98 the Court held
that no right of contribution existed under the federal antitrust stat-
utes. The Court declared that neither the legislative history99 nor
the intent of the statutes' 00 supported a federal common law right
to contribution. The Court, however, also stated the circumstances
under which a right to contribution could arise under a federal stat-
ute: "first, through the affirmative creation of a right of action by
Congress, either expressly or by clear implication; or, second,
through the power of the federal courts to fashion a federal com-
95 See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Texas In-
dus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
The Northwest Airlines case involved an airline seeking contribution for its liability for
discriminatory pay to women. The Supreme Court found that neither the language of the
Equal Pay Act nor Title VII, nor the legislative history of either act created a private remedy
of contribution. 451 U.S. at 94. In its opinion, the Court outlined the criteria for the crea-
tion of a right to contribution under a federal statute. Id. at 90. The Court, later in the
same term, clarified these in Texas Industries. See notes 96-1 01 infra and accompanying text.
For a further discussion of Northwest, see Comment, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union: Contribution in Title VII Cases, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 217 (1982); Casenote,
Liability of Union to Employer for Contribution to Backpay Award, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1521 (1982).
For a further discussion of Texas Industries, see Note, Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors De-
nied Under FederalAntitrust Laws. 65 MARQ. L. REV. 281 (1982); Comment, There is No Basis in
Federal Statutory or Common Law for Allowing Federal Courts to Fashion a Right of Contribution
Among Antitrust Vrongdoers, 50 CIN. L. REv. 821 (1982).
96 See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 638; Northwest, 451 U.S. at 90. See also note 101 infra
and accompanying text.
97 See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 638; Northwest, 451 U.S. at 90. See also note 101 infra
and accompanying text.
98 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
99 Id. at 639. The Court found that nothing in the legislative history of either § I of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), or § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), indi-
cated that Congress had even considered the idea of a federal right to contribution. The
Court also noted that when those acts were passed, 1890 and 1914 respectively, the concept
of contribution was not yet recognized in the general American law of tort. 451 U.S. at 644
n.17.
In contrast, it should be noted that 44 states and the District of Columbia now allow
some form of contribution. See note 92 supra. Furthermore, the legislative history of CER-
CLA indicates that a right to contribution should exist. See notes 19-34 supra and accompa-
nying text for CERCLA's general legislative history; see notes 102-14 infra and
accompanying text for a further discussion of the congressional intent with respect to
contribution.
100 The Court looked at the nature of the antitrust laws, and found that the "very idea of
treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and deter future unlawful conduct . "
451 U.S. at 639. It thus found that there was no reference to contribution because Con-
gress was not concerned with "softening the blow" of the antitrust laws. Id.
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mon law of contribution."' 0'1
The EPA argues that CERCLA meets both of the independent
tests of Texas Industries, and therefore a right to contribution exists
under the Act.' 0 2 The EPA contends that the first test is satisfied
because the legislative history could be found to expressly 0 3 or im-
pliedly 0 4 grant such a right.
The EPA maintains that CERCLA expressly authorizes contri-
bution for two reasons. 0 5 First, CERCLA defines liability by refer-
ring to the Clean Water Act'0 6 and a right to contribution has been
found to exist under that Act.' 0 7 Second, the legislative history of
CERCLA indicates that a right to contribution exists.' 08
101 451 U.S. at 638 (citation omitted).
102 See generally EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14.
103 Id. at 5. See also notes 105-08 infra and accompanying text. Compare H.R. 5640, supra
note 27, § 116(f). The proposed amendments to CERCLA that were passed by the House
in 1984 would have explicitly amended CERCLA § 107 to add a subsection allowing CER-
CLA contribution cases to be brought in federal court after adjudication of liability and
recovery of costs and damages. Id.
104 EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 6. See also notes 109-14 infra and accompany-
ing text.
105 Throughout its brief, the government refers to the fact that the court in United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), had previously indicated
that a right to contribution existed. See, e.g., EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 3. See also
Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 807 n.3 ("42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2), which provides for contribution,
was viewed as only having relevance in [the] joint and several liability context.") (emphasis
added; citation omitted).
106 See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text; compare CERCLA § 107(e)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982), with § 33(h) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(h) (1982).
107 See United States v. Bear Marine Servs., 509 F. Supp. 710, 716 (E.D. La. 1980), re-
mandedon other grounds, 696 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 557 F.
Supp. 335, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
108 The legislative history of CERCLA § 107(e)(2) seems to indicate that a right to con-
tribution exists. That section states:
Nothing in this title, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection,
shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any other person subject to
liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subro-
gation or otherwise against any person.
CERCLA § 107(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) (1982). A similar provision was included in
H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(e) (1980). In speaking about that section, Repre-
sentative Gore stated that under the joint and several liability scheme of the statute, any
defendant that paid all of the response costs to a plaintiff "would then have the right to go
against the other 'non-apportioned' defendants for contribution .... ." 126 CONG. REC.
26,785 (1980) (statement by Rep. Gore). The EPA argues that these facts indicate a con-
gressional intent to allow contribution under CERCLA. See EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note
14, at 5.
The Justice Department interpreted § 107(e)(2) as confirming a right of contribution.
126 CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980) (letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, Department ofJustice to Rep. Florio) (§ 107 (e)(2) "in our view
confirms that a defendant held liable for response costs has the right to seek contribution
from any other person responsible for a release or threat of release of a hazardous sub-
stance.").
One commentator has also stated that § 107(e)(2) guarantees contribution. See Note,
Generator Liability Under Superfund for Clean-Up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U.
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CERCLA implies a right to contribution, the Agency asserts, 10 9
because the legislative history implies that Congress intended to
make the joint and several liability under the statute less harsh by
allowing contribution.' 10 Furthermore, the EPA argues that Con-
gress intended to widely spread the costs for cleaning up dump-
sites. " ' The EPA further argues that without a right to
contribution, certain parties would avoid a settlement in a "Russian
roulette"" 2 game with the Agency, waiting to see who would be
sued. 1 3 Because Congress did not want to delay the settlement
process," 14 such a result should not be read into the statute.
The EPA contends that CERCLA also meets the second test. It
argues that Congress empowered the courts to develop such a rem-
edyll5 because such a remedy is needed "to protect uniquely fed-
eral interests."" 6 Under this argument, there are two federal
PA. L. REV. 1229, 1266 n.184 (1982); cf. Smith, infra note 109, at 50 ("the statute does not
expressly create a right to contribution").
109 See EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 6. The Supreme Court in Texas Industries
stated that an implicit "congressional intent may be discerned by looking to the legislative
history and other factors: e.g., the identity of the class for whose benefit the statute was
enacted, the overall legislative scheme, and the traditional role of the states in providing
relief." 451 U.S. at 639 (citation omitted).
Compare Smith, A Right to Contribution In Superfund Cost-Recovery Actions, 8 CHEM. & RAD.
WASTE LITIG. REP. 41, 52 (1984) ("no right to contribution may be implied from the
statute").
110 In passing CERCLA, Congress removed the original requirement that any response
costs would result in joint and several liability in order to make the results less harsh in
those cases where apportionment was possible. See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. The
EPA, citing that interpretation of the Chem-Dyne decision, states that without contribution,
the liability scheme will be "harsher" than the schemes in the bills introduced before the
compromise bill. Such a result would be harsh, since with joint and several liability, a few
defendants could foot an entire cleanup bill, while some other responsible parties would
pay nothing solely because the government did not sue them. Because CERCLA was meant
to be less harsh than those bills, such a harsh result cannot be implied by the Act's passage.
See EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 7.
111 In United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.NJ. 1983), the court found that "the
legislative aims of CERCLA . . . [included] goals such as cost-spreading and assurance that
responsible parties bear their cost of the clean up." Id. at 1114 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
112 EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 11.
113 Such a waiting game would delay the cleanup process because potential parties, es-
pecially smaller companies, would sit back and wait rather than get involved in a voluntary
cleanup scheme.
114 The Chem-Dyne court, citing 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119, 6119-20,
stated: "CERCLA was enacted both to provide rapid responses to the nationwide threats
posed by the 30-50,000 improperly managed hazardous waste sites in this country as well as
to induce voluntary responses to those sites." 572 F. Supp. at 805 (emphasis added). These
quick settlements are part of the aims of CERCLA. Furthermore, the EPA has written that
when looking at whether Superfund monies should be spent, "response personnel should,
to the extent practicable, . . . [conserve] Fund monies by encouraging private party clean-
up." 40 C.F.R. § 300.61(C)(2) (1984).
115 See EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 11.
116 Id. at 12 (citing the language of Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640).
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interests requiring protection. The first is finding a solution to the
"enormous and complex problem of national magnitude"117 that
releases from toxic waste dumpsites present. The second national
interest is protecting the Superfund from depletion. 1 8
Therefore, a court will probably find that a federal common
law right to contribution exists under CERCLA. Based on the leg-
islative history and the problems that CERCLA was meant to ad-
dress, this is a reasonable result. The problem then arises as to
what law the courts should adopt as the federal common law. Be-
cause the states have a variety of contribution laws, 1 9 this is an
open question.
B. The Uniform Contribution Act
The EPA has argued 120 that the courts should adopt the rules
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 ver-
sion). 121 The principles of section 4 of the Uniform Act have been
adopted in eighteen states, 22 including ten in the last decade.' 23
117 Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. The court distinguished the hazardous waste prob-
lem from other problems that were of more concern to the states, such as domestic rela-
tions and real property law. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that states have been unable
to respond to this problem, so a "national" solution is in order. Id. See generally sources
cited in notes 1, 19 supra.
118 The Superfund receives money from three sources: (1) taxes on "hazardous" prod-
ucts; (2) money from general appropriations; and (3) monies from suits brought under
CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982). See notes 5, 36-47 supra and accompa-
nying text. Since the third source of funding is necessary to keep the Superfund solvent
after the fund is used for cleanups, the federal government has an interest in seeing that it
is not depleted. Settlements, especially quick ones, further such an interest. See also notes
153-56 infra and accompanying text.
119 See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text. It is possible that a federal court could
use state contribution laws. See Smith, supra note 109, at 49. Federal common law, how-
ever, should be uniformly applied. See note 58 supra.
120 EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 14. See also Smith, supra note 109, at 50 (Uni-
form Act should be adopted as federal common law).
121 UNIF. CONTRIB. AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975) (1955 version) [here-
inafter cited as the "UNIFORM ACT"].
122 Ten states have explicitly adopted § 4 of the 1955 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 121,
(dates of enactment follow the cite). ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983) (1970); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (Supp. 1984) (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5) (West Supp. 1984)
(1975); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231B, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974) (1962); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17.245 (1979) (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1983) (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-38-04 (1976) (1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §.2307.32(F) (1981) (1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980) (1968)); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977) (1977).
Eight states have adopted provisions identical to § 4 in pertinent respects, (dates of
enactment follow the cite). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2504 (West Supp. 1984) (1984); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980) (1957); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, 302 §§ 2(c),(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985) (1979); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.295d(c) (West
Supp. 1984-1985) (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832(H) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (1980); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.455(1) (Butterworth 1983) (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A) (1984) (1979).
123 See note 122 supra. The EPA argues that this shows that the act reflects a modern
trend in the area of contribution law. EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 15.
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The EPA has stressed the importance of section 4 of the Uni-
form Act' 24 to its implementation of CERCLA. 125 Section 4 states
that when a tortfeasor settles in good faith with the person to whom
he is liable, that tortfeasor will be shielded from a contribution suit
brought by a non-settling tortfeasor. 126 In CERCLA cases, the
United States generally would be the "person" to whom a
tortfeasor, such as a toxic waste generator, would be liable. The
EPA contends that this rule would allow it to vigorously seek and
obtain settlements for cleaning up the dumpsites.127 To date, how-
ever, no court has ruled on the EPA's proposal to adopt the Uni-
form Act. 1 28
While the EPA's position does promote settlements, it has
some drawbacks. By arguing that the courts should interpret CER-
CLA to include the Uniform Act, the EPA is asking for more than
just the protection of settling parties mentioned in section 4. The
concept of pro rata apportionment is also included., 29 As well, sec-
tion l(d) of the Uniform Act states that a person who settles for less
than the full liability is not allowed to recover contribution from
anyone else. 130
124 Section 4 of the UNIFORM ACT, supra note 121, states in pertinent part:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the
same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in
the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribu-
tion to any other tortfeasor.
125 EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 14 ("policies and objectives of CERCLA will
most likely be achieved through the adoption of the [Uniform Act]").
126 See note 124 supra.
127 EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 14. The EPA believes that the protection of
the settling tortfeasor will induce settlements because a party will be able to save the costs
of two trials, a CERCLA suit and a contribution suit, and will not have to pay more than the
amount of his settlement. Id. This same rationale applies if a private person sues the re-
sponsible parties. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text for when a private party
may sue under CERCLA. See also Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236,
132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846 (1976) ("[flew things ...discourage settlement of disputed tort
claims, [more] than the knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality and would lead to
further litigation").
128 As of this writing, the Chem-Dyne case has not been settled or fully litigated.
129 See §§ 1(b) and 2 of the UNIFORM ACT, supra note 121. Section 1(b) states that the
"right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro
rata share of the common liability .... ." Id. § 1(b). Section 2 states that the "relative
degrees of fault [of the tortfeasors] shall not be considered" in determining the pro rata
share. Id. § 2. For reasons not to follow such an approach, see notes 133-49 infra and
accompanying text.
130 See § 1(d) of the UNIFORM ACT, supra note 121. That section states:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover
contribution from another tortfeasor whose libility for the injury or wrongful
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This latter restriction means that while a settling party is
shielded from suits, he cannot bring a suit to recover any settlement
that is more than his equitable share. Such a rule may actually hurt
the EPA's implementation of CERCLA by delaying or preventing
some settlements. A party afraid of settling for an amount greater
than his equitable share may bargain longer with the EPA to ensure
he makes no overpayment. The resulting delays would frustrate the
quick resolutions that the EPA seeks.
On the other hand, if settling parties were allowed to sue other
non-settling parties after a court had determined the latter's liabil-
ity, then such a delay could be avoided. A party could settle
quickly, secure in the knowledge that if he overpaid, he could still
recoup the overpayment in a contribution suit. The non-settling
parties could not complain about such a procedure, since they
would end up paying no more than their equitable share of the
cleanup costs. 13'
For these reasons, if a court accepts the EPA's argument that
the principles of section 4 of the Uniform Act are part of the federal
common law under CERCLA, it should also decide that the princi-
ples of section 1(d) are not part of the common law. A court should
find that any law under CERCLA for contribution allows a settling
party to sue non-settling parties to ensure that such a party does
not pay more than his equitable share. Thus, a court should find
that while some of the principles of the Uniform Act can be applied,
the entire Act is not suited for adoption as the federal common law
under CERCLA.13 2
death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a
settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
Id. § 1(d) (emphasis added). Compare § 3 of the Uniform Act discussed at note 132 infra.
131 For a further discussion of the factors involved in determining what is an equitable
share, see notes 133-49 infra and accompanying text. A court could take the reasons for the
settlement into account when deciding what is an equitable share.
Although the contribution laws of most states would prevent such a later suit, they
should be allowed under CERCLA. The Act requires joint and several liability in appropri-
ate cases. See notes 58-85 supra and accompanying text. Congress, however, did not want
too harsh a result to come from such liability and also wanted to spread the costs of any
cleanups. See notes 110-1 1 supra and accompanying text. As a result, federal common law
should reflect the special problems in this area and should allow a different rule to be used
to further the goals of the statute.
132 The principles of the UNIFORM ACT, supra note 121, should also be followed in two
other cases. Section 1 (c) of that Act states: "There is no right of contribution in favor of
any tortfeasor who has intentionally [willfully or wantonly] caused or contributed to the
injury or wrongful death." Id. § I (c). Such a principle should be followed in CERCLA
cases. Although CERCLA was designed to spread some of the costs of cleanups, see note
111 supra, it surely was not designed to reduce any cleanup costs of a party who intention-
ally or wilfully created a health hazard.
The principles embodied in § 3(d) of the Uniform Act should also be followed. Under
that section, if a party pays the entire amount of a liability through a settlement, then he can
seek contribution from the other parties. Id. § 3(d). The rationale for following this rule is
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C. Apportionment
Once a court has decided that a right to contribution exists
under CERCLA, it must then address the question of apportioning
that contribution. Presently, there is no uniform American rule on
how to equitably apportion contribution. 33 Some states have used
the rule that "equality is equity" and require that each tortfeasor
pay an equal pro rata share.'8 4
Other states use comparative fault to determine the amount
that each tortfeasor should pay. 13 5 Under that approach, each per-
son pays an amount based on his percentage of fault for a given
result. 136 The comparative fault approach represents the trend in
the area of contribution. 37
The legislative history 38 and the aims of the Act 39 indicate
that courts should opt for the comparative fault approach in CER-
CLA cases. 14° Court decisions' 4' and the recent proposed amend-
ments to CERCLA adopted by the House support such an
the same as for allowing a contribution suit even where a party settles for less than the full
cleanup cost. See notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
133 See PROSSER, supra note 55, § 50.
134 See, e.g., Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. App. 1966).
135 See, e.g., Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1962). See also UNIF.
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1984) (1977 version and 1979 Amend-
ments). Although no states have specifically adopted this Act, many of its principles are
incorporated into various state laws.
136 For example, in a multiple-party situation, this method of allocation might be used:
A sues B, C, and D. A's damages are $10,000.
A is found 40% at fault.
B is found 30% at fault.
C is found 30% at fault.
D is found 0% at fault.
A is awarded judgment jointly and severally against B and C for $6,000. The court may
also state in the judgment the equitable share of the obligation of each party:
A's equitable share is $4,000 (40% of $10,000).
B's equitable share is $3,000 (30% of $10,000).
C's equitable share is $3,000 (30% of $10,000).
See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, supra note 135, at 40 (section 2, illustration 2).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, comment h (1977). Compare the EPA's
argument regarding the recent trend towards the adoption of the UNIFORM ACT, supra note
121, which includes pro rata shares for contribution, note 129 supra. See also notes 122-23
supra and accompanying text.
138 See notes 19-34 supra and accompanying text for the legislative history of CERCLA.
139 See notes 1, 19-34, 111, 114 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the aims
of CERCLA.
140 Such an approach would help the courts to be flexible in determining the costs in an
area that can be very complicated factually. For an example of the complexity of hazardous
waste cleanup questions, see United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (289 generators or transporters at a site containing about 608,000
pounds of material, where some of the wastes have been commingled).
141 See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1248, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984);
United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,385, 20,387. See also
note 76 supra.
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NOTES
approach. 42 These sources suggest that a court should use its
broad equitable powers to determine the "fair share" owed by each
party.
A court should consider such factors as the role of each party at
the dumpsite,143 the amount of hazardous waste each party contrib-
uted to the dumpsite, 44 the degree of toxicity of such waste, 145 the
degree of care exercised by the parties, 46 and the degree of coop-
eration 47 between the parties and the various government authori-
142 See note 27 supra for a discussion of the recent House bill to amend CERCLA. The
EPA uses a variety of factors in deciding whether to pursue a recovery claim in the event
that it receives no answer to a demand letter. See EPA Memorandum, supra note 9, at 41:2867.
The relevant factors the Agency will examine include:
(a) the strength of evidence connecting the potential defendant(s);
(b) the availability and merit of any defense. Possible defenses under Section
107 of CERCLA are generally that the release and consequent response action was
the result of:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; or
(3) an act or omission by an unrelated third party as to whom the
owner/operator had no contractual relations and did not fail to exercise appropri-
ate care against the forseeable acts and omissions of that third party.
(c) the quality of release, remedy and expenditure documentation by the
Agency, a state or third party;
(d) the financial ability of the potential defendant(s) to satisfy ajudgment for
the amount of the claim or to pay a substantial portion of the claim in settlement;
and
(e) the statute of limitations.
Id.
143 See H.R. 5640, supra note 27, § 116(e), subs. (C); Gore Amendment, supra notes 27,
76, subs. (iv). Under CERCLA, there are four possible roles of a party at a dumpsite: pres-
ent owner, past owner, transporter, and generator. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying
text. In addressing this factor, a court should examine the length of time that a party was
associated with the site and the extent of that party's involvement with the site. In looking
at this latter factor, a court might examine how closely a party worked with the other parties
and what type of financial interest (including profits) he had in the site.
144 See H.R. 5640, supra note 27, § 116(e), subs. (A); Gore Amendment, supra notes 27,
76, subs. (ii). One court has ruled that the amount of waste contributed alone is not a
satisfactory means of apportioning liability, at least in the joint and several liability context.
See United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL.
L. INST.) 20,272, 20,275 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984).
145 See H.R. 5640, supra note 27, § 116(e), subs. (B); Gore Amendment, supra notes 27,
76, subs. (iii). This factor is important because the toxicity of the waste can affect both the
health hazard and the cleanup costs of a release. Under the recent House bill, the commit-
tee report stated:
[W]here several companies disposed of waste at a site where the harm was held to
be indivisible and one company disposed of a low toxicity waste in small volume at
the site, the court [under H.R. 5640] should use its equitable powers to limit the
damages paid by the one defendant in relation to other liable parties.
H.R. REP. No. 890 (Part I), supra note 27, at 56.
146 See the Gore Amendment, supra notes 29, 76, subs. (v). H.R. 5640, supra note 27,
does not speak directly of "due care," but seems to imply that it can be taken into account.
Id. § 116(e), subs. (C). On how to treat intentional, wilful, or wanton conduct, see note 132
supra.
147 See H.R. 5640, supra note 27, § 116(e), subs. (D); the Gore Amendment, supra notes
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ties. 148 Because these factors will vary with each case, one general
formula is inappropriate for all dumpsites. Therefore, courts
should adopt a flexible approach to contribution. Such an ap-
proach, while complicating matters by not providing a "bright
line," should actually help the EPA to reach settlements because a
party will know that the amount he will ultimately pay will depend
on numerous factors. 149 Thus, a party will look towards finding a
"realistic" formula for distributing the cleanup costs among the re-
sponsible parties rather than trying to hold out for paying only a
pro rata share.
D. Timing of a Contribution Suit
Timing of a contribution suit is also significant. Originally,
contribution suits were brought after the completion of the under-
lying litigation. 50 The practice later developed to allow implead-
ing' 5' of the other potential parties in order to decide all the issues
in a suit simultaneously.1 52 Courts must decide which of these ap-
proaches to use in CERCLA suits.
One of the purposes of CERCLA is ensuring that toxic waste
dumpsites can be cleaned up in the future using the monies in the
Superfund.153 Apparently, the intent of the statute is to quickly re-
plenish the funds that are used to finance a cleanup. Replenish-
ment would be accomplished by suing those parties that are
liable' 54 under section 107.155 This point is important because re-
ports show that the cost for cleaning up all of the hazardous waste
dumpsites in the United States exceeds the amount in the
27, 76, subs. (vi). This approach would reward parties that helped to further the public
policy goal of CERCLA of quickly cleaning up a release to prevent a continued threat to
public health or environmental damage. Whether a party tried in good faith to reach a
settlement would also be a factor.
148 The list of factors is not exhaustive, but merely reflects the type of information a
court should examine. Since each dumpsite is unique, other factors may be more relevant
in a given setting. Whatever factors a court decides to use, they should be weighed in a way
that a "fair and equitable" apportionment will be reached.
149 The EPA already uses some of these factors in deciding whether to bring a suit. See
note 142 supra. The EPA should adopt the rest of the factors in any settlement negotiations
in which it is involved because of the equitable nature of such a multiple factor approach.
150 See, e.g., Booth v. Manchester St. Ry., 73 N.H. 527, 63 A. 577 (1906) (no common law
right to join another party who would only be liable for contribution).
151 The term "implead" means to bring a new party into an action on the ground that
the new party is, or may be, liable to the party bringing him in, for all or part of the original
claim. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 679 (5th ed. 1979).
152 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
153 See notes 19-34 supra and accompanying text for the legislative history and purposes
of CERCLA. See also note 114 supra.
154 For a list of the parties potentially liable under CERCLA, see notes 48-50 supra and
accompanying text.
155 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
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Superfund. 56
Because a court struggle over contribution would delay replen-
ishing the fund, any district court asked to decide the contribution
issue together with the issue of liability to the Superfund should
consider a number of factors prior to allowing a joint action.
Before joining a contribution claim with a CERCLA suit brought by
the EPA, a court should examine the amount of time that the con-
tribution claim would add to the trial length. If it would cause a
significant delay, then the court should separate the issues. This
would ensure that the liability to the Superfund is handled first in
order to regenerate the funds by prompt repayment. 5 7 Thus, a
court should carefully examine the question of when a contribution
action should be brought, and generally should conclude that a
contribution action belongs in a subsequent, separate trial.
Another timing question has arisen in several recent cases: 58
can a potentially liable party sue for contribution towards "response"
costs if the government has not approved its cleanup plan? In the
cases where this issue has arisen, one party sued another party who
was potentially liable under CERCLA because he believed that if he
did not act, it would be sued by federal, state, or local environmen-
tal agencies and possibly prosecuted for violation of environmental
statutes. 5 9 In those declaratory judgment actions, the courts held
156 The House report on the pre-CERCLA bills, states that "[a]n EPA report estimates
that it will cost between $13.1 and $22.1 billion to clean up all hazardous waste that pose a
danger to public health and to the environment." H.R. REP. No. 1016 (Part I), 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6119, 6123. See also State ix rel.
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (citing other estimates for
total cleanup costs); H.R. REP. No. 890 (Part I), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1984) (report on
H.R. 5640) (the EPA estimates that the cleanup costs for the worst 2,200 sites is between $8
and $16 billion).
157 The EPA agrees with this approach. See EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, at 3
(footnote) ("[C]ontribution claims should not be tried at the same time as the main action,
for the delay and complication that would ensue would assuredly defeat the congressional
goals of rapid recovery of Superfund costs and expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste
sites."). See also H.R. 5640, supra note 27, § 116(f). The proposed amendments to CER-
CLA passed by the House in 1984 would explicitly authorize a contribution suit after adjudi-
cation of liability and recovery of costs and damages.
158 Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1984);
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See also Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvnL L. INST.) 20,376
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1984); id. at 20,716 (Aug. 29, 1984) (denial of motion to reconsider
previous opinion).
159 Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1440; Wickland Oil Terminals, 590 F. Supp. at
73. In Bulk Distribution Centers, the plaintiff had received a warning notice from the county
environmental board. Neither the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, the
county board, nor the EPA had actually instituted legal proceedings against the plaintiff.
589 F. Supp. at 1440. The state and county environmental agencies, however, had turned
down Bulk Distribution Centers' cleanup plan for the site in question. Id.
In Wickland Oil Terminal, the plaintiff instituted the declaratory action after the Califor-
nia Department of Health Services placed the former dumpsite on its hazardous waste site
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that no recovery is possible before the government approves the
cleanup plans and a party begins to incur actual expenses in clean-
ing up the site. 160
This result is fair because it delays the procedure for declaring
the liability for a cleanup until after the government approves the
cleanup plan. This will help prevent a site from undergoing two
separate cleanups, one under a private plan, and, should the EPA
find that the private cleanup was inadequate, a second under a gov-
ernment plan.' 6 ' Such a delay promotes CERCLA's general pur-
pose of expediting dumpsite cleanups. In addition, having only
one cleanup will save all of the parties money. Also, if a party
wishes to seek a declaratory judgment on the liability of the other
parties, he may still seek some relief in a state court under state tort
law or under a state superfund scheme. 162
IV. Conclusion
The Congress enacted CERCLA to solve what it saw as a na-
tional problem.163 Because of its hurried passage, however, that
statute contains certain gaps 164 that the federal courts 65 must
fill. 166 The courts have "filled" some of those holes and are pres-
ently trying to fill others, including those dealing with the right to
contribution for response costs. The focus of this note has been to
analyze this right in light of the purposes and history of CERCLA,
as well as recent court decisions and EPA policy interpreting the
Act.
It is now settled that a strict liability standard applies under
priority list. 590 F. Supp. at 75. The EPA had not yet acted with respect to the site, nor had
the state agency taken any further actions. Id.
160 Bulk Distribution Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1453; Wickland Oil Terminals, 590 F. Supp. at
77. The Bulk Distribution Centers court also noted that the plaintiff had not served a demand
letter for a "sum certain" as required by CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(B), 112(a), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9612(a) (1982), nor had it incurred any response costs consistent with
National Contingency Plan. 589 F. Supp. at 1454. See note 43 supra for a further discus-
sion of the National Contingency Plan. The Wickland Oil Terminals court found that "an
authorized governmental cleanup program, initiated by the EPA or by state authorities" is
required before there can be a private claim under CERCLA. 590 F. Supp. at 77.
161 For example, ifa federal court allows a CERCLA suit before the cleanup is approved
by the government, then liability could be assessed under the unapproved cleanup plan. If
the cleanup proceeds but does not satisfy a later EPA analysis of the site, then the EPA
could again haul the parties into court for further liability litigation under CERCLA.
162 For an analysis of the various state "superfund" acts, see Comment, State Hazardous
Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement? 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
10,348 (1983).
163 See note 1 supra and the sources cited therein.
164 For example, the statute does not expressly state whether joint and several strict
liability should apply in appropriate cases, or whether there is a right to contribution.
165 The federal courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA actions.
See CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1982).
166 On filling such gaps, see note 28 supra.
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CERCLA 167 and that liability can be joint and several under appro-
priate conditions. 168 Finally, some of the issues with respect to con-
tribution for response costs, such as whether such a right could
exist, are also decided. 6 9
Some of the issues that are still open include the exact federal
common law that should be used,170 the manner in which damages
should be apportioned,' 17 and the timing of a contribution ac-
tion.' 72 In deciding these questions, courts should look to the pur-
poses of CERCLA and to the way that the EPA has attempted to
implement the Act. 173 By using these as guidelines, courts should
be able to fashion decisions that lead to quick cleanups, quick re-
payment of expended Superfund monies, and equitable payments
for liable parties. Such results would comport with CERCLA and
with the intent of Congress to clean up dangerous waste dumpsites
as quickly and effectively as possible.
Kristian E. Anderson
167 See notes 58-69 supra and accompanying text.
168 See notes 70-85 supra and accompanying text.
169 See notes 105-19 supra and accompanying text. Although no court has actually had to
rule on this question, it seems likely that given the EPA's position in favor of contribution,
see, e.g., the EPA Chem-Dyne Brief, supra note 14, a court would probably rule in favor of the
Agency's positon. The Bulk Distribution Centers court stated that the EPA's interpretation of
CERCLA is entitled to considerable weight. 589 F. Supp. at 1448 (citing Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
170 See notes 120-32 supra and accompanying text.
171 See notes 133-49 supra and accompanying text.
172 See notes 150-62 supra and accompanying text.
173 See notes 9, 14 supra and accompanying text for examples of how the EPA is imple-
menting CERCLA.
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